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Abstract: There has been on-going interest in education for improved human-environment relations 
and a recent resurgence in the use of a variety of contexts and encounters for these purposes, including 
those to be found outside the traditional school classroom.  The curriculum making involved in these 
areas is more or less supported by discussions of epistemology and ontology.  This article considers 
what Tim Ingold's account of 'dwelling' might have to offer in support of some of the kinds of 
curriculum making involved in improving human-environment relations.  Ingold's work insists on a flat, 
continuous and processual ontology of dwelling and becoming.  It also examines how this can be 
reconciled with development, growth, knowledge and skill, and the passing of capacities between 
generations.  The article highlights implications for an understanding of curriculum making in general, 











We do not superimpose meaning on a world („nature‟ or „physical 
reality‟) that pre-exists apart form ourselves, for to live we must dwell in 
the world, and to dwell we must already relate to its constituents. Meaning 
inheres in these relationships. (Ingold, 1993, p. 222) 
 
Educators have for some time wished to encourage human-environment 
relations that are, however contested, more „sustainable‟ or „ecologically 
life-enhancing‟, or „for‟ the environment or biotic community.  The wider 
context of this article is curriculum making for these purposes.  Although we 
will turn to it more precisely later in the article, „curriculum making‟ in a 
commonsense view involves policy, implementation, practice, inputs, 
outputs, teachers, learners, local and wider contexts, and so on.  So for 
human-environment purposes, curriculum making raises ontological and 
epistemological issues concerning place, materiality and agency.  
 
This article‟s central contribution is to introduce into these discourses Tim 
Ingold‟s account of „dwelling‟.  We describe those aspects of his account 
that we see as central to the consideration of curriculum making in general, 
and for human-environment relations in particular.  The account rests on a 
flat and continuous ontology that rejects a range of dualisms, in particular 
the „intentional world‟ assumption of mindful representation necessarily 
preceding action upon an exterior reality.   
 
Ingold‟s writing is wide-ranging but has focused on these basic issues 
throughout, and is particularly informed by anthropology as well as 
philosophy.  It offers insights not only into the nature of experience but also 
learning, skill and agency.  At the same time, it gives greater ontological 
significance to the material and the other-than-human biota than either 
modernist or post-structural approaches would. 
 
Our contention therefore is that the application in curriculum making of 
Ingold‟s account of dwelling is particularly (though not exclusively) 
significant for the purposes of developing human-environment relations 
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through education.  The article concludes with some tentative steps towards 
just such an application. 
 
Context 
There has been international agreement on the need for educational 
responses to „environmental issues‟ since at least the Tbilisi Declaration 
(UNESCO, 1977).  We have seen the emergence of more international 
agreements that seek to make educational responses more „mainstream‟. For 
example, the World Commission on Environment and Development (World 
Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), 1987) introduced 
the need for education for sustainable development (Reid, 2002, p.74).  
There is now evidence of world-wide „mainstreaming‟ of green concerns in 
educational policy and curricular reform (e.g. Shallcross et al., 2007, Lotz-
Sisitka, 2006, Palmer, 1998, Tilbury et al., 2002).   
 
Such approaches seek to reconfigure, disturb, change and improve our 
everyday ways of life and the relations between humans and their 
environments, through a variety of pedagogies in and beyond the formal 
classroom.  So a part of the academic discourse about these educations 
focuses on the ontological and epistemological assumptions of the kinds of 
curriculum making involved.  These discussions have included: concerns 
with the restrictive characteristics of modernist forms of knowledge-
production (e.g. Stevenson, 1987, Huckle, 1996); the typing of „positivist‟, 
„interpretivist‟ and „socially critical‟ epistemologies (e.g Robottom and Hart, 
1993, Fien, 1993); the possibilities of post-structural approaches (e.g. Payne, 
1997, 1999, Somerville, 2010); the merits and difficulties of combining a 
range of epistemologies in accounts of pedagogical practice (Bowers, 2008, 
Gruenewald, 2003). 
 
The issue most pertinent to the present article is highlighted in Gough & 
Scott‟s tri-partite typology of models of learning for sustainable 
development, which they say are currently exemplified around the world 
(Gough and Scott, 2006, Scott and Gough, 2003).  These models explore the 
relationship between learning and change.  In so doing they illustrate how 
curriculum making might involve different assumptions about culture and 
nature (human-environment), epistemology and ontology.    
 
Of particular interest is that the types involve different assumptions about 
whether society emerges from biogeophysical nature (Type 1), or is socially 
constructed (Type 2) (2006, p.272-273). In Type 1, awareness-raising 
resulting from natural scientific enquiry leads directly to changed human 
behaviours.  In Type 2 change arises from (possibly emancipatory) social-
scientific insights into the social condition.  However, the final type (3) 
proceeds from a “co-evolutionary” view of social-environmental relations, 
where each influences the other through non-linear feedback; and where the 
complexity, uncertainty, risk, and inevitability of change mean that learning 
is central to change and its management. 
 
The ontological and epistemological foundations of Types 1 and 2 are 
relatively straightforward.  Type 3, however, is more difficult matter.  By 
identifying this type, Scott and Gough have incidentally highlighted the 
existence of a body of practice that remains philosophically relatively 
insecure. 
 
In this article we draw on Ingold‟s account of „the dwelling perspective‟ 
with a view to offering some grounding for this possibility of curriculum 
making built upon the inevitability and co-evolution of human-environment 
relationship.  Our ultimate purpose in discussing these issues is to build 
(perhaps re-build) philosophical confidence in the pedagogical practices that 
seek to improve or change human-environment relations (whether these be 
found within school classrooms, in cross-curricular projects, organisation-
wide approaches to the sustainable school, or more traditional approaches to 
fieldwork or „nature study‟ or outdoor education). 
 
The Dwelling Perspective 
We will structure our account as a series of central ideas from Ingold‟s 
writings that we have selected as bearing upon the question of a pedagogy 
for human-environment relations.  These are: ontological flatness, dwelling, 
learning as apprehending, attunement and enskilment, and agency.   
 
Ontological ‘flatness’ 
Tim Ingold has spent much of his time as an anthropologist looking at the 
interface between people and environment.  However the project ultimately 
dissolves the implied duality.  In The Perception of the Environment (Ingold, 
2000) he has drawn on ecological psychology and the philosophical writings 
of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty.   He says these discourses share the view 
that the world becomes a meaningful environment through active 
inhabitation rather than formal, cognitive representation (Ingold, 2000, 
p.173).  This rejection of an orthodox dualism also removes any such 
dualism in “human-environmental relations” and emphasises the processual 
character of form: 
   
Organic life, as I envisage it, is active rather than reactive, the creative 
unfolding of an entire field of relations within which beings emerge and 
take on the forms they do, each in relation to the others.  Life [is] the 
very process wherein forms are generated and held in place. (Ingold, 
2000, p.19)  
 
The term „environment‟ is rendered relative in Ingold‟s work: there is no 
environment without the folding and enmeshment
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 that is the process of life.  
Organism and environment are an indivisible process.  Organisms are not 
folded in on themselves and surrounded by „environment‟.  Instead 
organisms are points of growth of environment, and whose relations are 
rhizoidal (Deleuze and Guattari are referred to explicitly); and the 
environment is better understood as a “domain of entanglement” (Ingold, 
2006, p.13-14).  Many other dualities are simultaneously rejected. 
 
Ingold‟s argument here is pertinently captured in his view that environment 
should not be confused with „nature‟ (Ingold, 2000, p. 20).  For Ingold, the 
term „nature‟ tends to evoke a nature-culture binary where nature must be 
seen as being both real (constitutive of culture, as a western scientist might 
see it) and constructed (within culture, as a western anthropologist might see 
it).  However, as soon as it is admitted that this binary is itself a western 
cultural construction then an infinite regress emerges.  The way out, 
according to Ingold is to avoid altogether the basic premise, which is that 
humans live in intentional worlds where some externality is grasped 
conceptually as a precondition of effective action (Ingold, 2000, p.41).   
 
These ideas arise for Ingold out of an anthropological focus on hunter-
gatherer livelihood, and it is of course problematic that he himself is writing 
from within a given culture.  In response to this problem, he asks us not to 
compare western and hunter-gatherer cosmologies (which comparison 
invokes nature-culture binaries) but instead suggests that we  
 
follow the lead of hunter-gatherers in taking the human condition to 
be that of a being immersed from the start, like other creatures, in an 
active, practical and perceptual engagement with constituents of the 
dwelt-in world.  This ontology of dwelling, I contend, provides us 
with a better way of coming to grips with the nature of human 
existence than does the alternative, Western ontology whose point of 
departure is that of a mind detached from the world, and that has 
literally to formulate it – to build an intentional world in 
consciousness – prior to any attempt at engagement. (Ingold, 2000, 
p.41)  
 
In a temporal frame, one consequence of Ingold‟s account of life-process as 
co-evolution is the unification of history (culture) and evolution (nature) in a 
single ontological and epistemological process – the on-going emergence of 
human-environment.  This resonates with the curriculum making 
assumptions of the third type of learning for sustainability that Gough and 
Scott (2006) identify (above), if only at the level of approximation that the 
type itself evokes.  
 
Dwelling 
We now turn to the issues of how, in such an ontology of process, Ingold 
handles person-environment engagement („dwelling‟), before then turning to 
the question of learning.  The ecological anthropologies of Australian, 
Alaskan and Canadian hunter-gatherers‟ feelings, skills, sensitivities and 
orientations to other species, were important in the development of Ingold‟s 
thinking on person-environment engagement.  As we will show, he draws on 
Heidegger‟s work on „dwelling‟.  In later writings (e.g. Ingold, 2006) he 
tends to use the term „inhabitation‟ but we will use „dwelling‟ here. 
 
Ingold argues that humans can be understood to „dwell‟ in a way that does 
not involve pre-representing – let alone objectifying and separating – an 
environment before it can be dwelt-in.  He refutes the need to create 
intentional worlds of significance as a prerequisite of action.  His alternative, 
„dwelling perspective‟ is philosophically founded upon Heidegger‟s (1971: 
145-161) Building, Dwelling, Thinking (Ingold, 2000, p. 185-187).  
However while Heidegger argues that dwelling has been eroded by 
modernity, Ingold sees dwelling as the inescapable condition of existence 
(Jones, 2009, p.268).   
 
According to Heidegger, it was too narrow an etymological understanding of 
dwelling which supports the claim that humans must build (plan, design and 
manufacture) before they can dwell (within the thus-built world).  
Heidegger‟s conception of dwelling was instead that it amounts to the whole 
process of living.  Building – as with any other activity – is therefore a part 
of dwelling. 
 „We do not dwell because we have built, but we build and have built 
because we dwell, that is because we are dwellers…. To build is in 
itself already to dwell…. Only if we are capable of dwelling, only then 
can we build.‟ (Heidegger 1971: 148, 146, 160, original emphases).  I 
take this to be the founding statement of the dwelling perspective.  
What it means is that the forms people build, whether in the 
imagination or on the ground, arise within the current of their 
involved activity, in the specific relational contexts of their practical 
engagement with their surroundings.  Building, then, cannot be 
understood as a simple process of transcription, of a pre-existing 
design of the final product onto a raw material substrate. (Ingold, 
2000, p. 186) 
 
This is not only an argument about the construction in the architectural 
sense.  Ingold is arguing that the process of dwelling by which an ant co-
evolves with the environment of a tree is the same as that by which a human 
co-evolves with environment, whether tree or the skyscraper.  Even if there 
are fleeting moments of design, or of apparent „product‟, these do not lie 
outside the on-going process of human-environment co-evolution.   For 
Ingold, dwelling is a perspective that treats the immersion of the organism-
person in an environment or life-world as an inescapable condition of 
existence. 
 
Although this goes some way to re-describing human involvement in 
inevitable human-environmental change, it does not describe learning as part 
of that change.  Our account now turns to the issue of how growth or change 
is understood in this dwelling ontology.   
 
According to Ingold the world „„continually comes into being around the 
inhabitant, and its manifold constituents take on a significance through their 
incorporation into a regular pattern of life activity‟‟ (Ingold, 2000, p.153).  
Since organisms and environments are „coextensive‟ the same may be said 
of the inhabitant.  So organisms should be seen as points of growth that 
“issue forth through a world-in-formation” (Ingold, 2006, p.9), that are “are 
continuously coming into being as a part of the whole, while at the same 
time the whole too emerges:   
 
wherever growth is going on, organisms are coming into being, 
enfolding into their own constitution, and through their histories of 
becoming, the constellations of pathways within which they emerge 
(Ingold, 2003, p. 304)  
 
Apprehending and Learning 
Ingold‟s perspective on dwelling and growth rejects any need for intentional 
worlds and cognitive schemae to precede effective action. In terms of 
„learning‟, it follows that the capacities of organisms are not passed between 
them through context-independent ideas or propositional knowledge.  
Neither would Ingold accept that such capacities are determined genetically, 
which would be to assert an ontological priority of form over process that 
would be similarly inconsistent with the dwelling perspective.   
 
Instead, Ingold argues that organisms‟ capacities and knowledge are the 
„emergent properties of developmental systems‟ (Ingold, 2000, p. 38).  To 
„know‟ is to apprehend – a kind of engaged, perception-as-action in the 
world – rather than to construct (Ingold, 2000, p. 42).  Moreover, because 
the dwelling perspective begins from a continuous and flat ontological view 
of organism-in-environment – an ontological continuity between mind and 
body, self and other, and nature and culture – learning is not separated from 
knowledge.  If to know is to apprehend, so to learn is to apprehend, and the 
passing of capacities between organisms is part of the relational processes of 
unfolding in which organisms-in-environment come into being. 
 
„Curriculum making‟ is thus, in part, the making of the world into which the 
learner is born and grows:   
 
Knowing is indistinguishable from life activity of the organism-person 
in an environment that has itself been fashioned through the activities 
of predecessors and contemporaries. It follows that knowledge is 
perpetually generated rather than applied in practice. (Ingold, 2003, p. 
302) 
 
Ingold‟s theory of learning is therefore neither mentalist nor a narrow form 
of social constructivism.  It is probably most readily grasped through his 
discussions of enskilment and attunement. 
 
Attunement 
Ingold offers the term attunement for the manner in which our perceptive 
powers are gained.  Within a dwelling perspective, we are attuned (we may 
read here: we „learn‟) through directly apprehending our environment.  
Drawing on Gibson (1979) Ingold suggests that novices of a generation can 
be shown what is important by elders through an „education of attention‟ 
(Ingold, 2000, p. 22).  However this idea needs unpacked. 
 
Ingold‟s approach is anthropologically informed as being a process of 
gaining perceptual capacity within environment, for example in the way a 
hunter develops capacity to discern prey.  As explained above, this cannot be 
a capacity to compare evidence against a model, but is instead to generate 
organism-environment relations in which meaning inheres.  
 
The inter-generational process of education is neither transmission nor 
enculturation, but more a combination of creation, or unfolding, and 
discovery: 
 
Placed in specific situations, novices are instructed to feel this, taste 
that, or watch out for the other thing.  Through this fine-tuning of 
perceptual skills, meanings immanent in the environment – that is in 
the relational contexts of the perceiver‟s involvement in the world – 
are not so much constructed as discovered. (Ingold, 2000, p. 22) 
 
Skill, Enskilment and Agency 
In this flat and continuous ontology, then, the development of perceptual 
capacity is clearly not the development of efficiency in a loop of crossings 
between perceptions, mental constructions and actions.  Action and 
apprehension are ontologically a “close coupling of bodily movement and 
perception” (Ingold, 2008, p.214).   
 
Ingold‟s accounts of skill and enskilment most pertinently approach this 
ontological continuity of action and apprehension, or perception-as-action.  
He rejects the modern idea of skill as a use of the body and/or tool in the 
sense that implies separately an intentional agent and functional instrument.  
Instead, skill is again a primary condition of the relationality of craftsman, 
tools, materials and environment: 
 
In this sense the hands and eyes of the shoemaker, as well as his 
cutting tools, are not so much used as brought into use, through their 
incorporation into an accustomed (that is usual) pattern of dextrous 
activity.  Intentionality and functionality, then, are not pre-existing 
properties of the user and the used, but rather immanent in the activity 
itself, in the gestural synergy of human being, tool and raw material. 
(Ingold, 2000, p. 352, original emphasis) 
 
Skills, then, like apprehension co-evolve with the unfolding of the organism-
environment.  And as with apprehension, questions arise about how skills 
arise and how they are passed from organism to organism.  Clearly these 
questions bear upon curriculum making.  How is intergenerational learning 
is to be understood, for example in terms of how a novice hunter or 
craftsman learns skill: 
 
Traditional models of social learning separate the intergenerational 
transmission of information specifying particular techniques from the 
application of this information in practice… Now I do not deny that 
the learning of skills involves both observation and imitation.  But the 
former is no more a matter of forming internal, mental representations 
of observed behaviour than is the latter a matter of converting these 
representations into manifest practice… Through repeated practical 
trials, and guided by his observations, he gradually gets the „feel‟ of 
things himself … in this process, each generation contributes to the 
next not by handing on a corpus of representations, or information in 
the strict sense, but by introducing novices into contexts which afford 
selected opportunities for perception and action… (Ingold, 2000, p. 
353-354) 
 
Two further observations about skill in the dwelling perspective are worth 
making.  The first concerns the importance of growth and development in 
understanding agency.  According to Ingold, because of the ontological 
indivisibility of attentive perception and action, or apprehension, “all action 
is, to varying degree, skilled” (Ingold, 2008, p. 214).  Skills are the only way 
organisms interact with environments:  
 
The skilled practitioner is one who can continually attune his or her 
movements to perturbations in the perceived environment without ever 
interrupting the flow of action (Ingold, 2008, p.214) 
 
In the dwelling perspective these accounts of skill and enskilment have 
crucial implications for agency.  Since agency requires skill, and skill 
requires enskilment (i.e. growth or development), growth and development 
are necessary for the development of agency.  The effect of this move is to 
recognize oranismal agency, and to distinguish it from simple materiality, 
while continuing to reject mindful intentionality as a pre-requisite of 
subjective action on an objective world (and all the dualities that would be 
thus-entailed). 
 
A second observation that is worth making is that the above ecological 
approach to skill implies a particular understanding of human-environment 
relations.  In it, action in the environment (doing) is not separate from, but 
intimately bound up in, perceptual involvement with the environment 
(Ingold, 2000, p. 353).  
 
Both of these points seem particularly pertinent to curriculum making for 
environmental education, which is the context of this article. 
 
Summary: the Dwelling Perspective 
We have attempted to give an account of Ingold‟s dwelling perspective, to 
the extent that we think it bears on the question of curriculum making in the 
context of human-environment relations.  It has roots in philosophy, eco-
psychology and social anthropology, and it has critiques. 
 
In summary, Ingold‟s account is ontologically „flat‟ in the sense that a range 
of dualisms and attendant hierarchies are absent, and „ecological‟ in the 
sense of being relational and process-oriented.  Organism and environment 
are an indivisible process, an enmeshment in which people and other 
organisms are points of growth of environment, a dwelt-in world that rejects 
dualisms of nature/culture, history/evolution, mind/body and 
representation/reality.   
 
Human knowledge of the world, the development of skill, and the „teaching 
and learning‟ of these, are all achieved through embodied apprehension, 
attunement, and enskilment.  Meaning inheres in the relationships that make 
up the unfolding organism-environment meshwork – „the learner‟ inevitably 
both discovers and creates such relationships.  The learner does this amongst 
the nexus of relationships that have unfolded around the dwelling „teacher‟ 
or predecessor.  The passing-on of knowledge or skills is itself part of the 
co-evolving field of relations, and „educators‟ both inevitably co-evolve in 
these relations and draw „learners‟ attention to them.  
 
Dwelling, place and interconnection 
To some extent Ingold resists ontological critique with the central tenet that 
the dwelling „perspective‟ is not a competing cosmology but the primary 
condition of existence. 
 
However for the purpose of this article concerned with curriculum making 
for environmental education, we must raise the established critique that 
dwelling connotes something overly „local‟.  While the ontology focuses on 
organism/environment as indivisible relational process, it is less clear how 
extensive are these flows or relations.  This issue seems relevant in the face 
of global environmental issues. 
 
Geographers, who are also interested in how the concept of place can be 
retained in ontologies of continual relational unfolding, highlight the 
problem explicitly.  According to Cloke and Jones (2001), dwelling can only 
be a useful concept if we can also account for how places are connected with 
other places through the way ideas, people and materials flow in and out of 
them (Cloke and Jones, 2001, p. 661).  This is the interconnectedness with 
which we make sense of, for example, global climate change.   
 
Their solution is to re-admit representation alongside apprehension, skill and 
practice (Cloke and Jones, 2001, p. 662).  In as much as they attempt to 
resolve this ontological bifurcation, they argue that dwelling is both an 
embodied and mindful, imaginative embeddedness in environment (Cloke 
and Jones, 2001, p. 663).  However that is to loosen the grip of Ingold‟s flat, 
continuous, processual ontology of becoming, and to re-muddy the waters 
that underpin some of the kinds of practices that might be identified under 
Gough and Scott‟s (2006) third, co-evolutionary, type of learning and 
change in human-environment relations. 
 
Ingold himself responds to these issues of place and the interconnectedness 
of places.  He posits the idea that interlaced trails in the domain of 
entanglement of relations can „congeal‟.  These congelations can be read as 
places, though not by means of organisms‟ mindful constructions of them.  
Organisms become through their entanglement in them (Ingold, 2007) and 
perhaps apprehend the congealed nature of the relations through perception-
in-action, as described in previous sections.  
 
Consistent with this, Ingold notes that relationships between such congealed 
„places‟ can be accounted for, including by a distinction between 
inhabitation (a revised term for dwelling) and „occupation‟: 
 
From time to time in the course of history, however, imperial powers 
have sought to occupy the inhabited world, throwing a network of 
connections across what appears, in their eyes, to be not a tissue of 
trails but a bare surface. These connections are lines of occupation. 
(Ingold, 2007, p. ) 
 
Perhaps we can interpret this by suggesting that modernity is characterized 
by a relative abundance of lines of occupation.  Nonetheless, the relational 
modalities that make up the ontology of dwelling cohere, whether the 
connections are local or global.  Ingold‟s interest in the condition of 
existence is not freighted with politics in the way that „local‟, „global‟, 
„place‟ and „modernity‟ would otherwise be.  
 
Curriculum Making as the Enactment of New Ways of Dwelling 
Next we wish to draw upon our account of the concept of the dwelling 
perspective for what we have been calling curriculum making.  We are 
interested in the potential of Ingold‟s work because of our interest in 
education that attends to human-environment relations.  Some of the most 
interesting practices that might be gathered together in Gough and Scott‟s 
Type 3 (Gough and Scott, 2006) – particularly those that involve encounters 
with „nature‟ – are in need of theoretical grounding.  We are asking what the 
dwelling perspective – ontologically flat and continuous, fundamentally 
experiential – can offer curriculum making for human-environment 
relations. 
 
We make two steps.  Firstly, we more precisely explore the idea of 
curriculum making as the core singular process in the coming together of 
learners, educators, materials and places in order to generate knowledge 
through enskilled activity.  This exploration of the possibility of curriculum 
making as a flat singular space for curriculum formation arises from the 
dwelling perspective outlined above.   
 
Our contribution here is an extrapolation.  Ingold has not said anything (to 
our knowledge) about curriculum making per se.  However, as we have 
seen, he does consider knowing, learning, attunement, enskilment and 
agency.  Our second, and concluding step, is to consider whether curriculum 
making from the dwelling perspective offers points from which to work on 
the central concepts of „place‟ and „agency‟ in human-environment relations.  
 
Education as ‘Curriculum Making’? 
The term curriculum making has a long lineage.  For Schwab (1964) it was 
the „commonplaces of education‟ that linked pupils, teachers, subjects and 
the sociocultural context together.  For Grimmet and Chinnery (2009) it 
emphasizes the experiential as being in service of theorizing and 
conceptualisation. 
 
While these emphases on the real world and practice resonate with dwelling 
in one sense, they explicitly impose intentional worlds of form upon an 
external reality (in the use of terms like „curriculum‟, „subject (discipline)‟, 
„concept‟ and „content‟).  In so doing, they do not account for pupils co-
becoming as organism-environment, as the dwelling perspective does.  They 
similarly fail in as much as they define teachers („curriculum-makers‟) as 
guides to the acquisition of such pre-existent forms (of knowledge or skill).  
 
Neither can we deploy purely subjectivist or intersubjective accounts of 
curriculum making that ignore the role of place, however political or 
processual.  From a dwelling perspective, non-subject features of place 
(mountains, chalk-dust) are equally intimate parts of the process of 
organisms‟ becoming and attunement. 
 
Instead of these approaches to curriculum making, a dwelling perspective 
offers a view of „curriculum making‟ as a term to capture what is going on 
when people, places, materials and skills are engaged – coming together in 
curricular enactments.  This singular view is based on a strong „process‟ 
model.  It challenges other models that see curriculum as being both product 
and process, cognitivist and embodied, or subdivisible into discernable 
categories and standard tropes such as „official‟, „hidden‟, „observed‟ and 
„curriculum-as-experienced‟ (e.g. Pollard and Triggs, 1997).  In a dwelling 
perspective, the ontologies underpinning these distinctions are rejected. 
 
Curriculum as ‘Sense-making’? 
Of course, many theorists have previously sought to connect school-based 
education with the wider view of lived experience (Pinar, 2004, Grumet, 
1995).  A curriculum, after Grumet, is not about selecting key facts to be 
transmitted or sequenced in a certain way, but is instead “the process of 
making sense with a group of people, of the systems that shape and organize 
the world” (Grumet, 1995, p. 19).   
 
However, from the perspective of Ingold‟s account of dwelling, “making 
sense” needs to be more carefully examined.  Perception and action are 
combined in apprehension in this account.  Knowing is coupled with moving 
in the world.  „Sense-making‟ per se is an insufficient term unless its 
ontological roots are addressed.  In a dwelling account, sense-making is 
through apprehension and perception-in-action, attunement and enskilment, 
as opposed to mental modeling, construction and representation.  
 
Conclusion 
What are the purposes of introducing Ingold‟s ontology of dwelling to the 
domain of curriculum making?  To see „curriculum making‟ as the co-
evolution and becoming of indivisible, processual organism-environments, is 
perhaps to see curricula in new ways.  We now conclude by tentatively 
offering two starting points that are especially pertinent to education for 
human-environment relations.  At minimum the dwelling perspective might 
offer a refreshed view of the role of place in education, in general, and the 
development of new agencies in particular, such as those of other species.  
 
‘Place’ refreshed 
One important consideration will be to recognise afresh how place plays a 
role in all educational processes, including in relation to official curriculums 
that are often understood to be universalist, or place-less.  What kinds of 
interaction are possible between the universalist epistemology of official 
curriculum and the sorts of intrinsically uncertain, co-evolutionary human-
environment learning that Gough and Scott (2006) allude to with their Type 
3 (above)? 
 
As Jones (citing Henaff) puts it, from a dwelling perspective we need to take 
“seriously the particularities of the sites, the unpredictability of 
circumstances, the uneven patterns of landscapes, and the hazardous nature 
of becoming” (Jones, 2009, p. 321).  Curriculum policy and the official 
curriculum, then, must be seen as part of the enactment of new meanings 
that inhere in the relations that arise in mixes of teachers, pupils and places.  
Despite an official curriculum, different meanings will unfold in the 
(perhaps congealed) relations of the indoor classroom, or in museums, or in 
woodlands.   
 
Such a theoretical position might lie behind the resurgence in educational 
policy that wishes to explore the possibilities of diverse learning contexts 
beyond the school boundary, including nature kindergartens, outdoor 
learning and forest schools.  However, these approaches are often explicitly 
predicated on a differentiated or layered view of curriculum, such as 
differences between the prescribed, enacted, and experienced versions.  It is 
sometimes possible to feel the grating of wholly different ontologies and 
epistemologies in these practices (Beames and Ross, 2010, 103-105).   
 
Within a flat ontology of dwelling, curricula (including policies) are always 
more than representations; they are part of a single layer of reality found in 
the ever-evolving experienced curriculum.  By this view „curriculum 
making‟ and „curriculum experiences‟ are not distinguishable, and bound to 
the places where education occurs. 
 
New Agencies 
Taking the above seriously also requires an accounting of how other people, 
and other species, and their environments are part of the curriculum making 
(as dwelling) process.  Many new agencies are admitted that might 
otherwise be hidden in the way schools are represented: cut off from their 
cultures and from home environments at times.  In a dwelling perspective: 
not only are pupils‟ enskilment and attunement involved with relations with 
the material; and not only are they involved in relations with the becoming 
of their „teachers‟; there are also other points of growth, which might include 
older people, farm animals, pets, trees and wild species. 
 
Official curriculum policy developments that intend to involve more outdoor 
learning, or the wider community, can be understood as small shifts to 
relational, skill-based and attentive encounters between pupils, other people, 
other species and materials, as part of a wider view of curriculum-making.  
That is to say, new agencies are admitted by curriculum making as dwelling.  
 
For Ingold, agency resides in the ability of an organism to enact a skill, as 
has been discussed above.  Importantly, therefore, Ingold claims agency for 
living organisms over inanimate objects (such as sand or water), in contrast 
to other flat ontologies, such as Actor Network Theory (ANT) (Fenwick and 
Edwards, 2010), where „agency‟ is distributed throughout.  In the dwelling 
perspective, human agency is retained but emplaced within a wider view of 
organic agency of living things.  By allowing such a „voice‟ for the non-
human, it provides some theoretical terms for an enriched politics of human-
environment relations. 
 
In this article we have introduced Tim Ingold‟s account of dwelling to the 
extent that we think it pertains to environmental education.  The latter has 
well-established ontological and epistemological debates surrounding much 
of its practice.  But there are elements that have proven more difficult to 
ground theoretically – in particular, for example, those that insist on the 
experience of the outdoors to the ends of improving human-environment 
relations.  We suggest that an exploration of dwelling ontology might help 
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1
 It is perhaps worth noting that Ingold‟s use of „meshwork‟ is in part designed to 
distinguish his account ontologically from the „network‟ appropriated by Actor Network 
Theory (ANT) (Ingold, 2008).  In particular, he argues that ANT retains the notion of 
assemblages of relating „entities‟, whereas for Ingold there are lines and flows and 
„entities‟ are more completely relational in themselves. 
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